Manmohan Singh’s Pioneering Economic Reforms
Manmohan Singh, the mastermind behind India’s economic transformation, faced significant challenges to gain widespread support for his groundbreaking 1991 Union budget, which revitalised the nation from a severe financial crisis. As the newly appointed finance minister in the government led by PV Narasimha Rao, Singh showcased remarkable confidence, addressing journalists at a post-budget press conference and managing dissatisfied Congress leaders during parliamentary meetings.
Singh’s monumental reforms not only saved India from looming bankruptcy but also reshaped its path as an ascending global power. On July 25, 1991, Singh made an unexpected appearance at a press conference just a day after presenting the Union budget. This move was aimed at ensuring the accurate perception of his budget amidst officials who were less than enthusiastic, as noted by Congress leader Jairam Ramesh in his book, To the Brink and Back: India’s 1991 Story. This publication chronicles the rapid developments that emerged after Rao took office in June 1991.
Ramesh detailed how “the finance minister articulated his budget as ‘a budget with a human face’. He diligently defended proposals to raise fertiliser, petrol, and LPG prices.” Ramesh served as an aide to Rao during his early tenure.
Internal Party Challenges
Anticipating unrest among Congress members, Rao convened a Congress Parliamentary Party (CPP) meeting on August 1, 1991, allowing party MPs to express their concerns openly. As Ramesh observed, “The prime minister refrained from attending, permitting Manmohan Singh to endure the criticism alone.” Subsequent meetings were held on August 2 and 3, with Rao present throughout these discussions.
In these CPP meetings, Singh found himself isolated, with the prime minister offering no relief. Only two MPs—Mani Shankar Aiyar and Nathuram Mirdha—strongly supported Singh’s budget. Aiyar affirmed that the budget reflected the vision of Rajiv Gandhi regarding necessary actions to mitigate the fiscal crisis.
Under mounting pressure from party members, Singh conceded to reduce the proposed 40% increase in fertiliser prices to 30% while maintaining the hikes in LPG and petrol prices. Following this, the Cabinet Committee on Political Affairs met on August 4 and 5, 1991, to discuss Singh’s upcoming statement in the Lok Sabha on August 6.
“The statement eliminated the idea of a rollback that had been demanded previously, instead focusing on safeguarding the interests of small and marginal farmers,” Ramesh noted in his book. He concluded that both parties benefitted from this compromise; the Congress had prompted a reconsideration, while the core objectives of the government—price decontrol of fertilisers excluding urea and an increase in urea prices—remained intact.
This scenario exemplifies political economy at its finest—a model of collaboration between the government and the party leading to a mutually beneficial outcome.
